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Abstract 
Many studies have examined the determinants of ministerial selection. However, the effect of 
electoral incentives on government post allocation has so far not been studied in the 
literature. Drawing on data from the United Kingdom over the period 1992–2015, this article 
investigates the relationship between the selection of ministers and the electoral interests of 
the actors in this selection process —party leaders and members of parliament (MPs). The 
findings demonstrate that the greater the electoral safety of constituencies, the more likely 
are MPs to have a higher office. The results reveal a broader conception of party strategy in 
government formation than previously documented. The paper thus suggests that electorates 
can affect the allocation of ministerial positions in the UK. 
 
Keywords: electoral incentives; ministerial selection; legislative behaviour; United 
Kingdom. 
The selection of a group of people to govern a country is one of the first and most noteworthy 
choices to be made in every democracy. Citizens elect their parliamentary representatives in 
general elections, but it is only a portion of these representatives—the members of 
government selected by party leaders—that exercises the all-important executive authority. 
As a result, the determinants of this critical selection arise as a socially and academically 
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relevant question. In this article, we analyse ministerial selection in the UK to understand 
whether the electoral interest of the selectors and candidates in re-election is one of the 
determiners.  
Existing literature keeps the election of members of parliament (MPs) and the 
selection of government members apart as two separate processes. Once the votes are cast 
and counted, it becomes clear within hours who the MPs are and who has the support of the 
majority of them. At this stage, it is argued, ‘the main matter which is left undecided after the 
voters’ choice is the nomination of individuals to specific ministerial post or responsibilities’ 
(De Winter, 1995, p. 117). Understanding the ministerial selection as a rational choice of the 
leader, empirical studies show that personal attributes (Alderman & Cross, 1986; Buck, 1963; 
Heppell, 2012; King, 1981; Macdonald, 1987; Rose, 1971; Willson, 1959), party loyalty 
(Becher & Sieberer, 2008; Jun & Hix, 2010; Kam, 2009), and policy preferences (Kam, 
Bianco, Sened, & Smyth, 2010) of candidates are the determinants of ministerial selection. 
However, none of these studies considers ministerial selection as a process affected by 
electoral incentives. 
This article questions whether general elections influence not only who gets to choose 
but also who is chosen as government members. Theoretically, this puzzle refers to an 
important gap because electoral incentives are one of the central concepts in the rational 
choice approach to legislative behaviour – the very approach that underpins research in 
ministerial selection and informs our understanding of the phenomenon. Understanding of 
ministerial selection as a rational choice remains incomplete without a reference to electoral 
politics. Empirically, we still do not know whether there is a connection between the 
individual and partisan electoral incentives on the one hand, and the selection of team 
members to govern countries on the other. The literature on ministerial selection is yet to 
answer whether and how electoral incentives constrain the allocation of ministerial positions 
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to MPs. Does the electoral performance in terms of winning the last elections with a big 
margin, achieving a vote share above party average, or winning an election after election 
increase the likelihood of parliamentarians being appointed to the government?  
Our main finding is that electoral safety is indeed related to having a higher office: the 
greater the electoral safety of constituencies, the more likely are MPs to have a government 
post. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we review the literature on 
ministerial selection. We then present our understanding of electoral connection, and argue 
how electoral interests might affect the process of ministerial selection. This theoretical 
framework leads to two hypotheses. We provide justifications for having the UK as the case 
to study in the same section with the explanation of the ministerial selection process therein. 
This provides a solid basis for the discussion of the results before the conclusion. 
 
Ministerial Selection 
With the allocation of parliamentary seats to representatives completed in general 
elections, Carroll, Cox, and Pachón (2006) argue, the democratic electoral cycle enters into 
the ‘chapter 2’ stage, in which members of governments, committees, and boards are 
selected. As in the case of the ‘chapter 1’ stage, i.e. the election of parliamentary 
representatives, scholars have long been trying to find determinants of success in this new 
chapter as well, analysing first and foremost the ministerial selection in the British House of 
Commons. One early line of literature concentrates on the importance of personal attributes 
of parliamentarians. In one of the earliest examples, Willson (1959) showed that relevant 
experience in or outside parliament was an important criterion to becoming a member of the 
government as well as to graduating to the Cabinet in the UK. In the following decades, 
scholars reported an increasing importance of experience within the House of Commons 
because more and more government posts went to ‘career parliamentarians’, who entered 
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parliament at a younger age, had a promotion early on, and showed an ambition towards 
politics as a profession (Buck, 1963; King, 1981; Macdonald, 1987). As for increasing the 
representativeness of the government, other personal attributes also proved to be important, 
e.g. the social origin (Rose, 1971), gender (Heppell, 2012), and possibly ethnicity 
(Sobolewska, 2013) of parliamentarians.  
A subsequent line of study shares the rational choice approach from the early line, 
however, it frames ministerial selection particularly within the principal-agent model (Dewan 
& Hortala-Vallve, 2011), and therefore emphasises preference concurrence between party 
leadership (Kam, 2009) or backbenchers in general (Kam et al., 2010) as principals on the 
one hand and ministerial candidates as potential agents on the other. Party leaders prefer to 
allocate power and responsibilities to those MPs who share their policy preferences in order 
to minimise the agency loss and to maximise the desired policy outcomes (Allen & Ward, 
2009). Besides, MPs looking for advancement opportunities do not want to ‘displease those 
with the power to promote them’ (Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2011, p. 68). As a result, 
according to the main argument of this line of study, ministers are more likely to be among 
those MPs who share the preferences of the leadership or the collective ideals of the party as 
a whole. Likewise, empirical studies show that there is a strong positive relationship between 
voting with the party and the prospects of acquiring a higher office for parliamentarians 
(Becher & Sieberer, 2008; Jun & Hix, 2010; Kam, 2009). Checking the assumption from the 
other way around, Benedetto and Hix (2007) also find similar evidence among those 
parliamentarians whose progressive ambitions are frustrated by lack of appointment or those 
who were once office holders but were then sacked. These groups of MPs are found to be 
significantly more likely to rebel against their party. 
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The Electoral Connection 
The rational choice theories in political science share the assumption that political actors 
behave purposefully in pursuit of their preferences under the constraints of political 
institutions. The preferences are various but somehow compatible: while parliamentarians are 
motivated by re-election, power, and policy (Fenno, 1973), political parties pursue policy, 
office, and votes (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Elections loom large as the biggest constraint over 
these preferences. On the one hand, MPs need to stay in the parliament by being re-elected to 
be able to pursue other goals, including attaining promotion to government ranks. On the 
other hand, party leaders need to maximise the number of their MPs in order to stay in the 
government to achieve their policy ideals. This is why legislative behavioural strategies are 
shaped by the electoral conditions under which legislators compete for parliamentary seats 
(Fenno, 1978). 
 Electoral constraints differ with the marginality of seats for each MP in Westminster 
systems. In single-member districts, it is comparatively clear to members and to their leaders 
how electorally safe their parliamentary seats are. As the electoral marginality of a seat 
increases, or in other words as the number of votes separating success from failure to secure a 
seat decreases, re-election becomes the dominant motivation. Empirical analyses of 
legislative behaviour repeatedly show that MPs who only marginally won the previous 
election prioritise re-election seeking activities before anything else during their time in 
parliament (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Gaines, 1998; Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 
2005; Norton & Wood, 1993). Those who have to fight for their re-election have fewer 
resources to pursue other goals. For example, defining legislative roles over the motivations 
of British MPs, Searing (1994) finds that ‘[n]o one has sufficient time and energy to pursue 
vigorously all backbench roles at once’ (p. 81), and that those MPs who would like to be a 
minister should not specialise too much in policy areas such as constituency affairs. 
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 The effect of electoral marginality on ministerial selection emerges even before the 
elections. While still in the candidate selection process, safe constituencies of parties create 
higher demand and therefore tougher competition among potential candidates (Denver, 
1988). The relationship between safety and the competitive candidate selection process is 
perhaps most evident in electorally hopeless constituencies where parties fail to find any 
candidate to nominate for elections. As a result of demand and competition, safe 
constituencies yield a different and better incumbent profile – a profile that benefits 
incumbents in their search for ministerial office and a profile that party leaders would like to 
see in their government.     
A second source of effect becomes clear with the elections. After a general election, 
having been invited to form a government as the leader of the party with an overall majority 
of seats in the parliament (or in the absence of such a party, on the eve of signing a coalition 
agreement), the office is secured for the victorious party. What is left for the leader to do is to 
confront the trade-off between vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals while offering offices 
to the members of his party. In other words, allocating government offices is a constrained 
behaviour of the prime minister (Alderman, 1976), although it is at the same time ‘probably 
his most important power’ (King & Allen, 2010, p. 249). Therefore, as King and Allen argue, 
‘[e]very prime minister makes, in effect, some kind of cost–benefit analysis every time he or 
she decides to appoint or dismiss someone’ (p. 254). Office allocation carries varying degrees 
of costs. The party leader needs to offer the offices to the right parliamentarians among the 
members of his party in order to achieve the desired policy outcomes. At the same time, he 
needs to ensure that his decision does not cost his party votes, and thus seats, in the next 
election. It carries the risk of losing votes and seats because having an office changes the 
legislative behaviour of parliamentarians. Office holders spend less time in their constituency 
serving their electorates and become more oriented to national politics. The degree of risk 
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varies from one parliamentarian to another because the electoral safety of parliamentarians 
differs significantly. Offering a full time office to an MP with a large majority in her or his 
district is less dangerous than offering it to one with a very small majority for the next 
election. As a result, in balancing vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals, party leaders need 
to consider the electoral safety of the candidates for office. 
Thus, in order not to jeopardize their re-election, we assume that parties offer offices 
disproportionately to MPs with safe seats. Likewise, we assume that MPs from safer seats 
might already have better profiles or resources to be selected. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the electoral safety of a constituency, the more likely is 
the MP to have a government post. 
 
Constituency support is accumulative. MPs with longer tenure have more time and 
thus higher chances of accumulating personal votes for their name among their constituents. 
Those who have done so can then spend more resources on other goals and less on the goal of 
re-election. In other words, senior MPs may have more room than junior MPs to manoeuvre 
in prioritising their goals (Heitshusen et al., 2005, p. 37). Senior MPs have the chance to 
develop their personal vote over a longer period than their junior colleagues. As Martin   
(2011) argues, ‘longer-serving legislators can rely on past reputation for constituency-centred 
behaviour and may have less incentive towards contemporary constituency-centred 
behaviour’ (p. 481). Norton and Wood (1993) show that first-time incumbents do 
considerably better than MPs with longer tenure in increasing their votes in Britain. 
Similarly, Heitshusen et al. (2005, p. 39) find that the priority of constituency service for MPs 
decreases with their seniority in the parliament.  
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Insecurity is felt most strongly among the newly elected legislators (Fenno, 1978; 
Norton & Wood, 1993). Parliamentarians involve themselves in constituency service more in 
the early stages of their representative career (Anagnoson, 1987; Cain et al., 1987; Fenno, 
1978; Norton & Wood, 1993). Fenno (1978) discovered that congressmen who are relatively 
new in their seats travelled to their constituency more often than did their senior colleagues. 
Evidence of similar patterns has been found elsewhere. For one of the earliest examples, 
Anagnoson (1987) noted higher constituency activity among the parliamentarians who were 
newer to the New Zealand Parliament.  
As Cain et al. (1987) put these findings in a theoretical framework, being involved in 
constituency service at the early stages of their career is a strategic behaviour of 
parliamentarians. The potential to cultivate a personal vote is higher for new parliamentarians 
compared with those who have been in their seat for a longer time. On the eve of elections, a 
newly elected MP is yet to have any kind of relationship with the constituents as their 
representative in order to create an electoral support for her or his name. On the other hand, 
experienced parliamentarians, who survived an(other) election, have been building an image 
for at least a term, and they can now devote more time to the other functions of legislators. 
Thus we assume that parties strategically offer government posts in accord with electoral 
safety, especially among junior politicians: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the relationships assumed by H1 will be smaller 
among senior MPs. 
 
Research Design 
The House of Commons provides the perfect case to assess the electoral connection of 
ministerial selection due to electoral system, government size, and the candidate selection 
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process in the UK. To start with the electoral system, majoritarian systems are known to turn 
ministerial selection into ‘a relatively simple and mechanical process’ by excluding elements 
of negotiation within and between parties during government formation (De Winter, 1995, p. 
117). This allows us to examine electoral interests of party leaders and individual MPs. 
Moreover, the first-past-the-post system in the UK means that there are no ‘safe havens’ at 
the top of the party lists, which is typically reserved for the favourite candidates of each party 
in closed list proportional representation systems. Although there are surely safe 
constituencies for major parties, these seats do not often become available for candidate 
selection because these seats are invaluable for incumbents, who tend to stay in parliament 
for a long time (Denver, 1988). Furthermore, single-member districts reveal the electoral 
safety of every MP explicitly, making the electoral connection more likely to be considered 
by the decision-makers of ministerial allocation and easier to be assessed by the researchers. 
Pooling the data on all MPs, we assess the impact of electoral safety on the probability of 
obtaining an office first in our baseline model. To test the second hypothesis, we consider the 
interactive model to be the most suitable, conditioning Seniority on Electoral Safety in Model 
2.  
Second, ministerial selection affects an increasingly large number of MPs in the UK. 
The leader with the support of the majority in the parliament allocates up to 120 positions, 
approximately 100 of which go to MPs from the government benches (Berlinski, Dewan, 
Dowding, & Subrahmanyam, 2009). This means that almost a third of the parliamentary 
majority is given an additional duty, although this figure changes depending on the actual 
majority of the party in government. Nevertheless, the number of MPs with a ministerial 
office is comparatively high in the UK, affecting the representative focus of a large portion of 
the members from the party in power. Some members are allocated such duties repeatedly. 
We are aware of a possible bias given that an office holder is likely to be offered a post again 
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in the next tenure. That inevitably depends on her or his re-election, and thus indicates the 
safety of the seat. In order to control for this continuous dependency, we ran Model 3, which 
excludes all of the MPs who have held an office in the past. 
Candidate selection is the final advantage of the parliamentary system in the UK to 
study the electoral connection of ministerial selection. Although parties are strong actors 
within the recruitment of electoral candidates (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Sobolewska, 
2013), the overall process remains decentralised (Bille, 2001; Denver, 1988; Hazan & Rahat, 
2010; Hopkin, 2001). As a rule, candidates are nominated after a vote in every single 
constituency among the lists approved by the national party. Nevertheless, intervention of the 
party leadership and notably the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party (Norton 
& Wood, 1993, p. 9) cannot be completely ruled out of the candidate selection process. For 
example, the Labour Party has been using all-woman shortlists since the 1997 elections while 
the Conservatives introduced the ‘A-list’ of shortlisted priority candidates before the election 
of 2010 (Criddle, 2010). However, imposition of the list of candidates by the party 
headquarters, even for relatively principled reasons such as to improve the number of females 
and ethnic minorities in parliament, does not go down well with the local branches, and partly 
as a result of this, it does not always guarantee election (Criddle, 2010; Sobolewska, 2013). 
Therefore, central candidate selection is not possible in theory, and extremely rare in practice 
(Denver, 1988). In contrast to systems where the party leadership can decide who stands 
where on the electoral ballot, decentralised candidate selection in the UK prevents the 
practice of nominating future ministers from safe places, ensuring that any causal relationship 
between safe seats and office allocation runs only in one direction. 
Despite the evidence that candidate selection is a decentralised process in the UK and 
that party leaders cannot ‘parachute’ their favourite ministerial candidates to safe seats before 
the elections, we take a measure to ensure that causality does not run the other way around. 
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Candidate selection is often referred to as ‘the secret garden of politics’ (Howard, as cited in 
Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Ranney, 1965), and there is a risk that practice secretly deviates 
from rules and theory. To control for this, we have developed an additional model, Model 4, 
that includes only MPs who have contested and lost elections before entering parliament. We 
can confidently assume that MPs who have failed in their first election were not parachuted 
in by the party leader. 
To test the electoral connection behind ministerial selection, we have created our own 
data set, comprising statistics on parliamentarians from the ruling party or coalitions in the 
British House of Commons in the last five legislative terms (1992–2015).1 We obtained data 
on MPs, post allocations, and electoral majority from the parliamentary website of the British 
House of Commons and official websites of the political parties and their members. This 
amounts to 1804 individual-level observations to be analysed in separate cases within four 
logistic regression models with parliamentary term effects, estimating the probability of a 
legislator holding an office.  
In this article, we study the impact of electoral safety on the probability of obtaining a 
government post for MPs. We assume that party leaders would be less inclined to offer these 
posts to MPs who have been elected with a small majority, which might impede them from 
spending time on the constituency, in order not to jeopardise their re-election. Thus, we 
define ‘government post’ as an office that is allocated by the prime minister to the elected 
members of the House of Commons and that entails significant portfolio, parliamentarian or 
party responsibility. As the prime ministers are the ones who allocate these responsibilities, 
they are not included in this study. Moreover, although a large majority of government posts 
are allocated to the government MPs from the House of Commons, British governments can 
have unelected members, notably among the members of the House of Lords (King & Allen, 
2010, p. 250). This study excludes the unelected members of governments because they lack 
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the electoral connection defined above. Also excluded in the study are Parliamentary Private 
Secretaries because they are not appointed by the prime minister but by the senior ministers 
in the government as their own unpaid parliamentary assistants. Therefore, the following 
posts are considered as ‘government posts’: Secretary of State, Minister of State, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Whips, and Deputy Whips. We score the ‘post’ as a 
dummy variable, where ‘0’ denotes that the legislator does not have any significant portfolio, 
parliament or party responsibilities, and ‘1’ where she or he does.  
As for the main independent variable, we define Electoral Safety as the percentage 
difference between the votes for the incumbent MP and the candidate who came second in 
the general elections. Therefore, the higher the difference, the safer is the seat. Table 1 
presents summary statistics for the Electoral Safety variable. The most marginal seat has a 
majority of 0.03 per cent, while the safest seat enjoys a 74.4 per cent majority. 
 
Control Variables 
Before testing the hypotheses, we should acknowledge other alternatives that might explain 
the determinants for selection of ministers and whips:  
(1) Seniority: Party leaders tend to respect seniority, mainly in order to keep intra-
party politics out of dissent (Müller & Strøm, 1999). This variable aims to reflect 
the extent to which the MP is senior, by the number of years the MP has been in 
duty in the parliament. 
(2) Previous Office: More often than not, MPs are offered an office only if they have 
already had experience (Kam, 2009). A dummy variable denotes an MP who has 
had a ‘government post’ defined above (1) or not (0).2 We use this variable only in 
the baseline model.  
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(3) ∆ Vote Share: Ministerial portfolios may be offered as rewards for electoral 
success (O’Malley, 2006). The variable mirrors whether the candidate has done 
better than the average success of her or his party from the previous election (1) or 
worse (0).  
(4) Age: The literature is aware of the negative effect being older has on the chance of 
holding an office (Alderman & Cross, 1986; King, 1981). This variable reflects 
the age of the MP when elected. 
(5) Gender: While there are some implemented programs for promoting women in 
politics, political systems are still considered to be a ‘men’s world’. A dummy 
variable controls for that, scoring ‘0’ for men and ‘1’ for women. 
 
Results 
Percentages of MPs holding a government post are presented in Table 2. On average, during 
each of the five terms analysed one-third (32.82 per cent) of British MPs from the 
government party obtained a government post. Of the MPs whose election results were below 
the average national score, 35.2 per cent attained an office, compared with 36.4 per cent of 
the MPs whose vote share was higher than the average. Seventeen point six per cent of the 
representatives without any previous office obtained a government post, a much smaller 
fraction than the 58.6 per cent of the MPs who had held a government post in the past.  
With respect to the logistic regression analysis of our variables, Table 3 shows the 
results in the four models defined above. We find statistically significant support for both of 
our hypotheses. To start with Hypothesis 1, the effect of Electoral Safety is positive and 
statistically significant in each of the four models. These results thus confirm our theory and 
demonstrate that MPs are more likely to obtain an office if they are from safer seats.
3
 This 
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continues to be the case even when we control for a variety of other variables. For example, 
being a female would increase the chance of getting an office. Moreover, being elected at a 
late stage in life significantly decreases the probability of having an office. The model 
concludes that seniority does not play a role in the chances of obtaining a post. Table 4 
further demonstrates that an MP who had an office in the past is almost four times more 
likely (60 per cent) to obtain an office in the current term than an MP without office 
experience (16 per cent).  
This brings us to Hypothesis 2, examining the way in which the seniority of the 
legislator influences the relationship between electoral safety and the chance of obtaining an 
office. Model 2 suggests that the effect of electoral safety on office allocation depends on 
seniority. More explicitly, as opposed to a senior MP, a junior MP would be less likely to 
receive an office when lacking a safe seat. This is shown by the negative and statistically 
significant interaction effect between electoral safety and seniority. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that electoral safety has a positive impact on the probability of 
having a ministerial office only if the MP has spent less than 20 years in parliament. For a 
newly elected MP in the house, the effect of gaining 1 per cent increases the probability of 
obtaining an office by 0.7 per cent. For an MP who has served 20 years in parliament, the 
effect of the same gain in majority will increase the probability of a government post by only 
0.2 per cent. However, our argument that a safe seat increases the probability of obtaining a 
post does not hold among senior MPs, those who serve more than 20 years in parliament. The 
more senior a politician becomes, the higher the chances are to accumulate her or his personal 
vote in the constituency, and thus decrease the time required to be spent in the constituency 
pursuing re-election. Therefore, it should not matter to the party leader whether a senior MP 
holds a safe seat when contemplating ministerial selection. These findings confirm our main 
argument about party strategy and the way parties prioritize their objectives. For junior MPs, 
14 
 
it is highly relevant to cultivate their reputation in the constituency, especially when they hold 
a marginal seat. Therefore, party leaders will be reluctant to offer those MPs ministerial 
responsibilities that limit them from spending time in the constituency. This does not apply to 
senior MPs, whose reputation is well established, and thus the effect of electoral safety on the 
probability of attaining an office is insignificant. 
There are other findings that confirm the importance of electoral safety on the 
decision to whom to allocate ministerial offices. We find that individual electoral 
performance in terms of relative increase or decrease in vote share does not have an effect on 
ministerial selection in general. However, we also find that Electoral Safety conditions ∆ 
Vote Share, the extent of electoral success of an MP compared with that of other MPs from 
the governing party. MPs with exceptional electoral success have been rewarded with an 
office only when the candidate holds a very safe seat. This also means that decreasing the 
vote share below the party average is a problem for ministerial selection only for those MPs 
from safe seats. This is indicated by statistically insignificant results in Model 1 in 
comparison with the positive and statistically significant interaction effect between ∆ Vote 
Share and Electoral Safety in Model 2. 
Figure 2 plots how the effect of ∆ Vote Share on government post allocation is 
predicated on the extent to which the seat is safe. We find that party leaders allow themselves 
to reward a successful candidate with an office only when she or he obtains more than a 44 
per cent majority. For an MP with a 44 per cent majority, the effect of good results in the 
elections (better than the average of the party) increases the probability of obtaining a 
government post by 8 per cent. For a representative with maximum safety, a successful 
performance in elections will increase her or his probability of getting an office by 23 per 
cent. However, below a 44 per cent majority, candidates who have performed well in the 
election are not more likely than other candidates to have an office. These findings provide us 
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with further evidence of the hierarchy of goals that dictates party strategy. Party leaders are 
primarily concerned with re-election; only when candidates hold a safe seat might they be 
rewarded for increasing the vote share. 
Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of ministerial selection for different levels 
of electoral safety, for each of the three models. Analysing the baseline model, of the MPs 
with a majority of 5 per cent, one out of 10 is predicted to attain an office. For legislators who 
achieved a 20 per cent majority, about 15 per cent are predicted to hold an office. More than a 
fifth (22 per cent) of the MPs who have a majority of 35 per cent are likely to obtain a 
government post. The two other models predict roughly the same probabilities of ministerial 
selection. 
We now move to discuss Models 3 and 4, which aim to address causality issues. 
Model 3 examines the probability of obtaining a government post only for MPs who have not 
held a post before. The model demonstrates evidence that politicians elected in safe seats are 
more likely to get a government post even if they lack any office experience. Those findings 
support our argument even if we control for this strong predictor of ministerial selection. The 
last but definitely not the least important finding that further confirms the direction of the 
causality between Electoral Safety and Office is presented in Model 4. Could it all be ‘the 
other way around’, i.e. do party leaders send their favourite candidates for ministerial office 
to safe seats before the elections? As we have discussed above, we have strong theoretical 
and practical evidence that this is not the practice in the UK. However, if it were the case that 
the party leadership ‘parachutes’ their future ministers into safe seats, it would be most likely 
that those candidates would win the election. Model 4 aims to address this complication and 
examines only MPs who have lost at least one election before a successful election.
4
 The 
results suggest that even those MPs are more likely to be offered a government post based on 
the safety of their seat. As already discussed, Figure 3 illustrates the impact of electoral safety 
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on the probability of MPs gaining an office, and it demonstrates that the impact is consistent 
and positive among all the MPs and likewise among those MPs with no office experience and 
those who lost elections before entering parliament.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown how electoral incentives shape party strategy in allocating 
ministerial portfolios. Rational choice theories on the hierarchy of motivations assume that, 
although rational actors such as parties and their members pursue many goals, they are first 
and foremost concerned about re-election. We have argued that for this assertion to hold, we 
should observe that MPs with marginal seats are less likely to be offered portfolio 
responsibilities because such responsibilities might significantly risk their re-election 
chances. Our findings confirm this assertion. In the UK, government offices are occupied by 
MPs with safer seats. Because we had anticipated that previous office experience would have 
a substantial impact on office allocation, we tested our assumption also on those MPs with no 
previous experience in portfolio responsibilities. We also acknowledge the risk of opposite 
causality, and have generated a model that controls for it. All models support our theory, and 
show that offices are allocated in accord with the electoral safety of the seat. 
Our results, furthermore, demonstrate that electoral safety also matters for rewarding 
successful candidates. The findings suggest that party leaders are more likely to reward MPs 
and offer them a ministerial post when they hold a safe seat. This also indicates the way 
parties prioritize re-election goals; they will be reluctant to reward successful MPs if this 
reward jeopardises their re-election. Because the cultivation of personal vote and reputation is 
more important for junior MPs, we have assumed that senior MPs would be less sensitive to 
the electoral safety of their seats than junior MPs, who need to establish their reputation in 
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the constituency. The analysis implies that senior MPs, especially those who serve more than 
four parliamentary terms, should not be concerned with the safety of their seat in order to 
attain a government post. Those results highlight the importance of personal vote cultivation 
both for candidates who seek higher office and for party strategy.  
Altogether, these findings highlight the meaningful weight of the re-election ambition 
both for parties and for parliamentarians, and show that safety comes first. Most obviously, 
parties pursue ambitions other than re-election, which they trade-off. This paper 
demonstrates, however, that electoral safety constrains that trade-off. When the prospect of 
re-election is in danger, vote ambition outweighs other ambitions. Only when re-election is 
secured are other ambitions more likely to be taken into account. As a result, elections might 
be more than the dual mechanism of choosing a legislative representative and a party leader 
in parliamentary systems. Besides, electorates can affect the allocation of ministerial 
positions as well. 
This study is the first attempt to address the question of whether the electoral safety of 
MPs has a bearing on their possibility of being selected as ministers. The findings show a 
strong statistical relationship between electoral safety and ministerial selection, which 
suggests a causal effect. Nevertheless, these findings open the door for further research in 
order to bolster this relationship of cause and effect. Although the statistical relationship 
found in this study is compelling, there is still a clear need for more research testing how the 
electoral safety of candidates is taken into account within the process of ministerial selection. 
Substantively, our study shows a link between electoral circumstance of politicians 
and ministerial selection. Further research should examine whether this connection holds in 
other cases. The first-past-the-post electoral system creates a strong incentive to cultivate a 
personal vote. Because our findings underscore the impact of personal vote cultivation on 
party strategy, it is important to analyse other electoral systems with different degrees of 
18 
 
personal vote cultivation. The electoral incentives stemming from electoral safety could have 
an additional effect on ministerial selection. Further studies should also focus on the way 
other determinants of post allocation are influenced by electoral incentives. Post allocation is 
one of the most influential mechanisms for the elite to control the executive branch. 
Understanding how electoral incentives affect that process is crucial, both for legislator 
behaviour models and for electoral studies. 
 
Notes 
1. This period provides a sufficient variation of electoral safety for both of the major 
parties in the UK. On the one hand, it covers the first government terms of Labour 
(1997–2001) and the Conservatives (2010–2015) with high levels of electoral safety 
after a period in opposition. On the other hand, it also covers the last terms as the 
government with declining levels of electoral safety for Labour (2005–2010) and the 
Conservatives (1992–1997). 
2. Experienced MPs can be immediately reappointed as a minister following the general 
election or after a gap due to reasons such as a period in opposition, resignation, or 
dismissal.  We code this variable the same for all MPs with or without a gap in their 
experience as a minister. 
3. The effect of electoral safety on the probability of obtaining an office is positive and 
significant for both Conservative and Labour MPs (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
4. It is worth noting that Conservative MPs are more likely to have fought one or more 
parliamentary elections unsuccessfully (53 per cent) than the Labour MPs (37 per 
cent). 
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Table 1.   Descriptive Statistics for the Continuous Variables (n=1804). 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Electoral Safety 23.67 14.82 0.03 74.4 
Seniority 9.01 8.53 0 50 
     
Note: This table presents the statistics of the Electoral Safety and Seniority variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
TABLE 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables. 
  .                MPs holding an office (%)               . 
Total 
(Offices) 
Total 
(MPs) 
Decreased  
∆ Vote 
Share 
Increased  
∆ Vote 
Share  
Without 
previous 
office 
With 
previous 
office 
        
1992 Conservatives 35.9 42.3 28.2 57.7 116 332 
1997 Labour 31.1 22.7 18.1 60 90 346 
2001 Labour 26.8 26.7 15.7 51.6 110 411 
2005 Labour 38.2 42 28.1 56.5 139 354 
2010 Conservatives 36.9 36.2 15.4 65.1 111 304 
2010 Lib Dems 42.3 48.3 0 60.5 26 57 
 Total: 35.2 36.4 17.6 58.6   
        
Notes: This table presents the total government posts allocated to party members in each 
parliamentary term in the years 1992-2015. Numbers show the percentage of post holders 
for each category. For example, 31.1 per cent of Labour MPs in 1997 who had achieved 
worse results than their party held a post, compared with 22.7 per cent of the MPs who had 
done better. The model excludes MPs who contested in constituencies that were newly 
created by previous seats, because ∆ Vote Share cannot be calculated.   
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 TABLE 3.  Logit Models of Government Post Allocation in the UK, 1992–2015. 
 Model 1 
All MPs: 
Baseline 
Model 
Model 2 
All MPs: 
Interactive 
Model 
Model 3 
MPs with no 
government 
post experience 
Model 4 
MPs contested and 
lost, before 
entering parliament 
 
     
Electoral Safety 0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.041*** 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.056*** 
(0.01) 
Previous Office 2.18*** 
(0.159) 
2.143*** 
(0.162) 
  
Seniority –0.0109 
(0.012) 
0.033 
(0.019) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.024) 
∆ Vote Share 0.0178 
(0.125) 
–0.427 
(0.26) 
–0.008 
(0.167) 
0.194 
(0.266) 
Seniority X 
Safety 
 –0.002** 
(0.001) 
  
∆ Vote Share X 
Safety 
 0.019* 
(0.009) 
  
Age –0.089*** 
(0.01) 
–0.091*** 
(0.01) 
–0.089*** 
(0.013) 
–0.068*** 
(0.019) 
Gender 0.429** 
(0.125) 
0.426** 
(0.161) 
0.579** 
(0.195) 
1.09*** 
(0.304) 
Parliamentary Term Fixed Effects 
1997 –0.948*** 
(0.214) 
–0.853*** 
(0.219) 
–1.17*** 
(0.266) 
–0.956* 
(0.434) 
2001 –0.93*** 
(0.196) 
–0.849*** 
(0.199) 
–1.02*** 
(0.25) 
–0.755 
(0.428) 
2005 –0.025 
(0.193) 
–0.015 
(0.193) 
0.116 
(0.242) 
0.339 
(0.417) 
2010 –0.526** 
(0.193) 
–0.439* 
(0.198) 
–0.991** 
(0.3) 
–0.748 
(0.446) 
N (Obs) 1804 1804 1187 475 
N (Cluster) 1209 1209 852 358 
Constant 2.511*** 
(0.446) 
2.397*** 
(0.477) 
2.202*** 
(0.562) 
0.682 
(0.855) 
Log Likelihood –900.401 –892.606 –523.812 –197.692 
     
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression model results. Table entries are 
logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Model 3 
excludes MPs who have held a post in the past. Model 4 excludes MPs who won 
elections the first time they contested them. All MPs are from government parties. 
The model excludes MPs who contested constituencies that were newly created by 
previous seats, because ∆ Vote Share cannot be calculated. *p < 0.05; **p <0 .01; 
***p < 0.001, two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 4.  Predicted Probabilities for   
                   Government Post Allocation. 
Variable Predicted Probability 
  
All at mean 0.29 
Electoral Safety  
at minimum 0.08 
at maximum 0.49 
Previous Office  
no 0.16 
yes 0.6 
Seniority  
at minimum 0.17 
at maximum 0.11 
  
Notes: This table presents the predicted 
probabilities of ministerial selection, based 
on Model 1. All other variables held at 
their median (ordinal) or mean 
(continuous) values.   
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Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Electoral Safety on Government Post Allocation Conditional on 
Seniority. 
 
 
 
Notes: All other variables held at their median (ordinal variables) or mean (continuous 
variables) values. All estimates are based on Model 2. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Change in Vote Share on Government Post Allocation 
Conditional on Electoral Safety. 
Notes: All other variables held at their median (ordinal variables) or mean (continuous 
variables) values. All estimates are based on Model 2. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of Government Post Allocation. 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 3(a): Model 1 – For all MPs; Figure 3(b): Model 3 – Only for MPs with no 
government post experience; Figure 3(c): Model 4 – Only for MPs who contested and lost 
before entering parliament. The figures present the predicted probabilities of government post 
allocation, based on Models 1, 3, and 4. All other variables held at their median (ordinal) or 
mean (continuous) values. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1. Logit Models of Government Post  
                     Allocation in the UK, 1992–2015. 
 Model 5 
Labour 
Model 6 
Conservatives  
   
Electoral Safety 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
Previous Office 2.08*** 
(0.211) 
2.186*** 
(0.241) 
Seniority 0.003 
(0.017) 
–0.009 
(0.017) 
∆ Vote Share –0.199 
(0.158) 
–0.098 
(.017) 
Age –0.101*** 
(0.015) 
–0.071*** 
(0.015) 
Gender 0.341 
(0.187) 
0.625 
(0.333) 
N (Observations) 1111 636 
N (Clusters) 562 591 
Constant 2.742*** 
(0.668) 
1.44* 
(0.659) 
Log Likelihood –544.711 –341.128 
   
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression 
model results. Table entries are logistic regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Model 5 includes only Labour MPs; Model 6 
includes only Conservative MPs. All MPs are from 
government parties. The model excludes MPs who 
contested in constituencies that were newly created 
by previous seats, because ∆ Vote Share cannot be 
calculated.  *p < 0.05; **p <0 .01; ***p < 0.001, 
two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
